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Abstract
Spending almost US$700 billion to combat insurgents in Afghanistan, the U.S. population should be hopeful that they “bought”
something of value as the Afghan War concludes. This exploratory study focuses on evaluating operations within Afghanistan
by accounting for enemy and civilian losses. Integration of civilian losses offers an opportunity to evaluate operations that
represent societal losses to the Afghan people. Regression estimates using zero-inflated negative-binomial models indicate
that military operations resulted in more civilian casualties than enemy losses.
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Background

The Counter-Terrorism Industry’s Purpose

Only a few days after 9/11, U.S. troops were deployed to the
Middle East (South-West Asia) to begin preparing their campaign against the terrorist group responsible for destroying
New York City’s World Trade Center. Approximately 13 years
after this military buildup, this War is expected to be drawing
to a close as Afghans will now take the primary role of security
(Lila, 2013). Billions of dollars were spent in fighting the war,
but the effectiveness of this effort has not yet been accurately
assessed. Although assessments have been accomplished, they
are questionable in their reliability and validity (DownsMartin, 2011). In addition, the analysis of data is limited and
attempts to forecast (Downs-Martin, 2011). The complexity of
assessing the Afghan War is founded in the fact that the U.S.
population is hopeful. Spending record amounts on defense,
the U.S. population should be hopeful that they are “buying”
something of value. Yet, as Downs-Martin (2011) argues, current assessments using past and present data to determine
some future accomplishment are dubious.

The U.S. military in its current state, including the
Department of Defense (DoD), has established infrastructure that is far more advanced than the rudimentary infrastructure necessary in late 2001. These resources come at
an increasing cost. Advanced weapons, aircraft, surveillance systems, and other countless associated pieces of
equipment are bought and paid for by the American people.
Therefore, the American people have a right to know how
their resources have been used. Such transparency is purported by some government officials, but others characterize the U.S. Government’s transparency as being little more
than smoke and mirrors. Before an assessment can be made,
the definition and purpose of the military must be defined.
This may seem a simple task, but when one considers the
vast array of military institutions, their operations, and
the public’s perceptions of what the military should do, the
mission of the military becomes less clear. This study will
refer to the U.S. Armed Forces as the “military” and reflect
only the decisions within the span of military commanders.
Thus, political forces and intent are not the focus of this
assessment, but rather the actions and decisions of the U.S.
Armed Forces.

Introduction
This article focuses on assessing the military in combat operations in Afghanistan. To accomplish this, the military is
defined and a review of literature that quantifies and assesses
military operations in Afghanistan follows. This article then
discusses the impact of the Afghan War on the Afghan people
and offers evidence of the widespread impact the Afghan War
had on civilians. An analysis and discussion of enemy engagements in Afghanistan follows and focuses on the casualties of
war as a measure of military effectiveness.
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The Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,
published in March 2013, defines the purpose of the armed
forces as such:
The US Armed Forces fulfill unique and crucial roles, defending
the US against all adversaries while serving the Nation as a
bulwark and the guarantor of its security and independence. The
US Armed Forces function within the American system of civilmilitary relations and serve under the civilian control of the
President, the Commander in Chief. The US Armed Forces
embody the highest values and standards of American society
and the profession of arms. (U.S. Army, 2013, p. i)

Today’s military is embroiled in a war far different than the
wars that shaped the structure, culture, and traditions of the
U.S. military. The men and women of the military are trained
to survive and win under war conditions. Nation-building
and community policing are not the primary objectives for
which members of the military are trained. The objectives of
military basic training may be considered a clear representation of what the military expects from members; they are a
reflection of what leaders demand to be instilled in all service members. Although each branch of service in the U.S.
Military (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines) differs by method
and training needs, they do share many similar characteristics. Military training certainly emphasizes physical fitness,
but a large component of basic training is changing the way
the trainee thinks. Military ethics, values, discipline, and tradition ensure that trainees will obey commands and respect
the chain of command. Field training exercises (FTX) and
rifle/handgun training both ensure that the trainee is prepared
for battle. FTX are designed to mimic austere war conditions. Trainees are required to perform military operations
with very little sleep. Rifle and/or handgun training ensures
that all trainees know how to fire a weapon with accuracy
and maintain that weapon for reliable action. Military basic
training serves a critical purpose: It ensures that the men and
women of the military will behave as expected when war
occurs. Military basic training does not emphasize human
rights or government building. As one might expect, emphasis is placed on killing while not being killed. Ethics such as
“service before self” are an effort to inculcate the trainee to
place the greater good and mission success over that of individual needs. With such a mind-set, it should be of no surprise that military members have difficulty showing kindness
to civilians of an enemy state. Military members are best
suited to be engaging with combatants.
Often, entities outside of the military are tasked to facilitate the efforts of the War on Terror. Agencies such as the
DoD (apart from the military branches), Department of
Homeland Security, Central Intelligence Agency, Department
of State, and the Department of Justice have fulfilled the mission of the War on Terror and continue to do so. In addition,
contractors also provide a great deal of the manpower needed
to fight this war. In fact, defense contractors outnumber
troops in Afghanistan and have since 2007 (Brewin, 2013;

Miller, 2007). Thus, any assessment must encapsulate the
efforts of all these participating entities.

Assessment
Assessments should provide a data-driven method to inform
policymakers, government agencies, and the public of how
well resources are currently being utilized and inform decisions that alter resource allocation in an effort to improve efficiency. Although the value of an assessment is rarely disputed,
the measures used in assessment are often criticized. The output of a war is generally nonlinear and measures to determine
success are often hidden and/or subjective. Political and economic measures have long been used to determine the effectiveness of the Afghan War. The results of these studies only
serve to further cloud the true effectiveness of the Afghan War
effort (Downs-Martin, 2011).
If the goals of the Afghan War are to change the political
climate in Afghanistan, they have been met equally as well as
the goals of the Vietnam War. During that era, assessment of
the War endured a significant transition. Determining the
value of assessment during military campaigns gained attention during the Vietnam War when the Military Assistance
Command, Vietnam (MACV) and federal agencies in the
United States expressed their dissatisfaction of techniques
used to acquire and analyze data prior to the Hamlet
Evaluation System (HES). The HES was a reaction to the
lack of validity and reliability of data obtained by the MACV
and the Vietnam government which included subjective data
using unreliable measures (Gayvert, 2010). The HES, started
in 1967, was a concerted effort to collect political and insurgency data at the hamlet rather than the village level in
Vietnam because it was a more accurate measure of the population (Gayvert, 2010). The HES was an effort to better
assess how the campaign was truly changing the population
at a time when U.S. government and population questioned
the effectiveness of the war. The granularity for the HES was
crucial because it was the hope of the American people that
communist ideology would not take hold in Vietnam. Yet,
the ideology of the Afghan people is not the central concern
of the Afghan War. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has made
it clear that the purpose of the Afghan War was to combat al
Qaeda (Thompson, 2014). The Afghan security forces are
tasked with continuing the pressure to keep al Qaeda at bay.
Ideology of the people in Afghanistan is not an objective;
thus, political measures may be an inconsistent measure.
Downs-Martin (2011) argues that major flaws plague current methods of assessment. The flaws include the potential
for overoptimism when military members are asked to determine whether operations are effective. As Downs-Martin
points out, overoptimism is a favorable characteristic of
leadership as it encourages progress, but in assessment, it can
produce inaccurate results. Data collection, analysis, and
depiction of trends are also areas for improvement for current methods of assessment. Thus, data may be collected but
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without consistency, appropriate analysis, and representation; the results can be incomplete or misleading (DownsMartin, 2011). In addition, assessments based on an end goal
are particularly problematic in Afghanistan because the goal
has shifted during the span of the war and because political
stability is difficult to assess considering the heterogeneous
composition of Afghanistan (Downs-Martin, 2011).
Downs-Martin (2011) argues that objective analyses of
the complex nature of terrorism and insurgency conducted
in a time frame that is useful are highly unlikely and concludes that any “operational/strategic counterinsurgency
assessment in Afghanistan must be subjective” (DownsMartin, 2011, p. 116). Yet, the need for an objective assessment that accounts for the total security situation is crucial
(Cordesman, 2015). Ineffective measures and assessments
based only on hostile forces have resulted in short-sighted
goals (Cordesman, 2015). This study aims to assess operational counterinsurgency operations using a cost-benefit
analysis of casualties. As crude as it may be, body count, or
casualties, may be one of the only measures that is relatively accurate and may be most useful in determining how
well operations are conducted.
Body count is more complex than simply the number of
terrorists that were killed. Casualties of friendly forces, noncombatants, and civilians negatively affect populations
around the globe. When a parent of a fallen military member
is informed of his or her loss, the ensuing pain of that loss is
difficult to conceptualize. Although obvious, it is important
to note that the pain of loss is no less for the Afghan people
who continue to endure losses as result of this war. This
impact on a population has the immense potential of changing the course of the War and, thus, the outcome of a campaign assessment.

The Afghan People
The deaths of innocent civilians caught in the middle of war
may be the greatest cost of the Afghan War. Shaw (2002)
estimates the ratio of “innocent Afghan” civilians to
American losses to be more than 1,000 to one (p. 355). The
innocent casualties of war can be argued to be a negligible
loss for one of two reasons. First, equal or greater losses
would have occurred without intervention. Second, the civilians’ losses are small compared with enemy losses.
Many great military members and contractors were lost in
this War and that is a terrible price to pay, but those who
serve know the danger of serving. When service members
are deployed, there is no reason to believe they are out of
harm’s way; quite literally, they are putting themselves
directly in harm’s way. This in no way diminishes the loss of
their lives, but their loss cannot be assumed as unforeseen.
On the other hand, the Afghan civilians have little choice but
to attempt to survive the conflict. The Afghan people will see
the cost of war in their villages, government, and culture.
Unlike military members, they are not being compensated
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for the hazards they face. It is also questionable whether the
outcome of the War will benefit them.
In a War fought with the awesome might of the United
States, Britain, France, and other superpowers, the Afghan
civilians are forced to withstand and survive as bystanders.
The greatest atrocities occur when children are killed by an
unexploded ordnance or exposed to the toxins created when
ammunition having depleted uranium (DU) cores have been
reported. Unexploded ordnances can leave children crippled,
maimed, or dead. Afghanistan from 2000 to 2002 has the distinction of experiencing the highest number of casualties in
the world (Bilukha & Brennan, 2005). Data from the United
Nations Mine Action Center indicate that as the number of
casualties due to landmine detonations decreased, casualties
caused by unexploded ordnances increased. Moreover, the
proportion of children being injured or killed by unexploded
ordnances increased; children accounted for 42% of all injuries due to unexploded ordnances (Bilukha & Brennan,
2005). Although the United States reports that no ammunition having DU were being used in Afghanistan, the Afghan
people suggest they have been used and are the cause of
increased cancer rates and birth defects (Miraki, 2006). The
use of DU is not central to this study, but it does highlight a
substantial and long term cost of the Afghan War.
Ghufran (2008) found that the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) was having difficulty reducing insurgent activities.
In addition, although many Taliban fighters have been
killed, this came at a high price in the form of civilian lives.
Ghufran identifies the dilemma of the Afghan War: Killing
Taliban forces results in killing civilians and the killing of
civilians is counterproductive for the Karzi administration.
Civilian deaths result in antigovernment and anti-U.S./
coalition sentiments. Moreover, the psychological and societal costs of the massive loss of life cannot be understated.
Similarly, war-stricken nations have reported high rates of
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD); 94% of children displaced due to the conflict in Bosnia reported symptoms of
PTSD (Bhutta, 2002). The widespread and staggering loss
of life in Afghanistan is certainly detrimental to Afghan
society, but it may also ensure that peace is less likely in the
region. Bhutta (2002) argues that PTSD results in a cycle of
violence. Figure 1 depicts operations in which enemies
were engaged in Afghanistan.
Figure 1, derived from data from The Guardian, depicts
the widespread impact of operations in Afghanistan. Southern
areas of Afghanistan have seen the greatest concentrations of
enemy action operations, but many operations are scattered
around the country. Benini and Moulton (2004) found an
“unequal distribution of civilian victims across local communities” (p. 405). Many communities have no civilian
losses, but a small portion has a great number of losses. Their
data were relegated to Operation Enduring Freedom and
does not extend beyond 2003, but their findings seem to be
supported by the data in this study. Although operations in
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Figure 1. Operations in which U.S. forces engaged with the enemy.

Afghanistan are widespread, certain regions have far more
violent action than others. To make the direct impact to the
population more visible, Figure 2 depicts the population density of Afghanistan. The data depicted in Figure 2 were
acquired from The Guardian.
As is visible when comparing the enemy action map
(Figure 1) and the population map (Figure 2), the southeastern portion of Afghanistan has a great deal of both people
and enemy action. Thus, a greater portion of people in these
areas have been directly exposed to war. Although northern
areas of Afghanistan are exposed to fewer enemy action
operations and western areas of Afghanistan are not as populated, it should be expected that the people of the area have
had some exposure to war, albeit indirect.
War is a life-altering event for any military member. Most
civilian Americans will never be exposed to war directly but
may be told stories of war by a family member or friend. These
stories often depict heroic actions of service members defending the very freedom that most Americans take for granted.
Afghan civilians will spend generations telling the stories of
the Afghan War. The most riveting and surviving stories will
likely be those of human tragedy. In 2009, the U.S. military
claimed a 28% reduction in civilian casualties due to a shift in
strategy that included a reduction in the number of air strikes
in populated areas (Mullen, 2010). Yet, United Nations
Assistance Missions in Afghanistan (UNAMA) found that
civilian deaths increased by 14% in the same period (UNAMA,
2010). The contrary findings between the U.S. Military and

UNAMA may be a result of different data sources or procedures in obtaining data. During the Gulf War, military strategy
attempted to reduce the number of civilian casualties and the
impact of destroyed targets on the civilian population; yet, it
was implementation that prevented the strategy from being
effective (Knights, 2003). Pilots and targeteers continued to
use overwhelming destructive power that resulted in far more
suffering than intended (Knights, 2003). Leaked videos from
conflicts in Afghanistan reflect the overwhelming use of force
on targets. Such evidence, despite the possibility that these
incidents occurred infrequently, fuels a lack of confidence for
international forces.
Distrust and tension continue to be a concern between
the Afghan government and international military forces
(Mullen, 2010). This distrust should be expected to be
shared among the civilian population via informal social
networks. Thus, for every misstep that American missions
take, generations of enumerable children will be told of
these atrocities and change the very culture, the very reality that these individuals impart on themselves. For this
reason, the global community has a right to know the
effectiveness of military troops. The global community
will suffer the missteps of American and coalition troops
for generations to come.
Despite the expectation that Afghans would view
American influence as negative, a 2010 study conducted by
the Asia Foundation found that 83% of Afghan respondents
see the introduction of Western values as positive (Rene,
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Figure 2. Population density in Afghanistan.

2010). What complicates these optimistic results is that the
Asia Foundation’s survey results also indicate most Afghans
(62%) feel that speaking negatively about the government is
not acceptable (Rene, 2010). In addition, corruption and nepotism have become rampant; this further deters the growth of
the nation and increases the potential for an ineffective government (Maley, 2011).
As stated, assessment of operations in Afghanistan must
be a measure that has a quieting effect; that is, the measure
must be simple and objective. The most identifiable consumer of the Afghan War is the Afghan people, so any assessment must include the impact to the population. In addition,
the Afghan people pay the greatest price of the War. Thus,
the cost and benefits most affect the Afghan people.
Americans and the U.S. government are interested in eliminating terrorists who target the United States and its interests.
Therefore, the most direct method to measure success is to
compare the benefit, killing terrorists, against the cost, killing innocent civilians. Operations that kill or injure more terrorists than civilians are a simple yet effective measure of
success. The Afghan War was and is more than simply killing
terrorists; it is also considered to be a humanitarian effort.
Thus, a protection policy is inherent when one of the war’s
goals is to help the Afghan people become and feel safe. In
meeting this goal, forces should identify those that are
directly affected and develop ways to protect them (Bonwink,

2006). Using data from U.S. operations in Afghanistan, this
study aims to address the following research question:
Research Question 1: Do operations in Afghanistan provide more good, in the form of killing more terrorists,
rather than doing more harm by killing innocent civilians?
The following hypotheses will be tested:
Hypothesis 1: When engaged in operations involving
enemy forces, civilians and friendlies are more likely to
be wounded or killed than enemies.
Hypothesis 2: When engaged in enemy operations,
enemy forces are more likely to be killed.
Hypothesis 3: Over time, operations have become less
deadly for Afghan civilians.
Hypothesis 4: Killing or injuring more enemies relates to
killing even more nonenemies (civilians and friendlies).
These hypotheses are written such that finding no support
for Hypothesis 1 would indicate that Afghan War operations
are less likely to kill civilians or that enemy operations are not
related to the number of civilian deaths that occur. Support for
Hypothesis 2 would indicate that operations in Afghanistan
are more likely to kill enemies. On the other hand, if results
do not support HA2, operations in Afghanistan were not
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effective. Hypothesis 3 is focused on how good operations in
Afghanistan have become in avoiding civilians over the
course of 6 years (2004-2009). Finally, a comparison of losses
of all operations between enemies and nonenemies (civilian
and noncombat) is tested to address Hypothesis 4.

Method
The greatest cost of war is the loss of lives; it is also the
greatest benefit. Dead enemies represent the benefit and dead
civilians and friends (known as friendlies) represent the cost.
The deaths of the innocent and the enemy can be farreaching; each in their own respect. The death of a terrorist
may act as a deterrent and could potentially stem further
recruiting of terrorists. A death of a civilian could feed an
antiwar sentiment, promote the agenda of the terrorists, and
result in long-lasting societal costs.
Thus, in an effort to assess the success of military operations in Afghanistan, this study utilizes open source data from
The Guardian on enemy and civilian casualties during combat operations. Prior to 2008, no assessment plan was put into
place, thus including data on operations during this time is
vital. It is argued that enemy casualties represent the benefits
of operations during the Afghan War because a ubiquitous
goal of the Afghan War has been to eradicate al Qaeda. The
death of noncombatant and friendlies are considered a cost of
war. The data used in this study utilizes information reported
on individual missions from 2004 until 2009; these operations
culminate into a data set having 76,597 observations.
Variables used in this study include the type of operation, year
of the operation, the number of enemies killed, enemies
wounded, civilians killed, civilians wounded, friendlies
killed, and friendlies wounded. To obtain a better understanding of the cost of lives affected, the sum of wounded and
killed were calculated to obtain a total number of enemy casualties. In addition, the sum of killed and wounded from civilian and friendlies were calculated to represent the innocent
lives that were impacted due to the operation. Below are the
descriptive statistics for variables used in this study.

Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports the number of incidents of each action when
the type of action was recorded. Enemy action events were
most common and compose approximately 37% (n = 27,093)
of all incidents from 2004 to 2009. Explosive hazards, generally improvised explosive device incidents, occurred second
most often and composed approximately 31% (n = 23,083)
of all incidents. Counter-Insurgency events occurred least
often of known incidents; only .06% (n = 43) of the incidents
were of this variety. Together these incidents compose some
74,159 operations/missions in which the U.S. Military
engaged.
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of data used in the
empirical analysis. The unit of analysis is each incident.

SAGE Open
Table 1. Military Engagement by Action.
Action
Enemy
Friendly
Noncombat
Suspicious incident
Explosive hazard
Friendly fire
Detainee operation
Counter insurgency
Criminal event
Unknown incident
Air mission
Total

Incidents

Percent

27,093
13,734
7,719
208
23,083
148
1,208
43
480
12
431
74,159

36.53
18.52
10.41
0.28
31.13
0.20
1.63
0.06
0.65
0.02
0.58
100.00

Some operations were not given a designation for the type of
operation. In total, 76,911 incidents were recorded from
2004 to 2009. The number of wounded and killed is the focus
of this study. Events that resulted in the killing or wounding
of enemies can be considered successful engagements while
incidents resulting in killed or wounded “friendlies,” hosts,
and civilians are considered unsuccessful engagements. Of
particular importance is the number of innocent persons that
were killed or wounded in respect to the number of enemies
that were wounded or killed. An engagement may be considered successful if more enemies were killed/wounded than
civilians. Overall, incidents have an 11% chance of resulting
in a killed or wounded friend. Civilians are more likely to be
killed or wounded; this occurs 17% of the time. Twenty-eight
percent of incidents resulted in nonenemies being killed or
wounded. On the other hand, enemies were killed or wounded
22% of the time. The maximum number of enemies killed in
any operation recorded is 181 persons. Sixty-seven civilians,
27 hosts, and 16 friendlies were the maximum persons killed
during these operations.

Empirical Results
Hypothesis 1 sought to determine whether nonenemies were
more likely to be killed during operations when the enemy is
engaged. A zero-inflated negative-binomial regression model
is used instead of a Poisson regression model to account for
the zero-heavy count data. In addition, this regression model
was chosen over a negative-binomial regression model
because zeros in this data represent significance rather than
nothing. Zero losses during a military engagement is meaningful, thus, the zero-inflated binomial model was chosen.
Coefficients in these models are reported in incident rate
ratio (IRR). Negative relationships are demonstrated with
coefficients between 0 and 1. For example, an IRR of 0.5 can
be read as an increase of one unit in the independent variable
will result in a 2-unit decrease in the dependent variable.
The results, reported in Table 3, indicate that during operations in which enemies were confronted, nonenemies were
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Table 2. Friends, Hosts, Civilians, and Enemy Casualties.
Variable
Year
Wounded
friend
Killed friend
Wounded
host
Killed host
Wounded
civilian
Killed civilian
Wounded
enemy
Killed enemy
Killed or
wounded
friend
Killed or
wounded
civilian
Killed or
wounded
enemy
Killed or
wounded
nonenemy

Minimum Maximum

n

M

SD

76,911
76,651

2,007.617
0.0951847

1.356568
0.5599079

2,004
0

200g
23

76,646
76,650

0.0149519
0.1109328

0.2089043
0.7542557

0
0

16
54

76,649
76,649

0.0495245
0.1179924

0.4762659
1.356844

0
0

27
147

76,650
76,598

0.052107
0.0238126

0.707894
0.4098823

0
0

67
44

76,601
76,646

0.1986789
0.1100253

1.904452
0.6577881

0
0

181
31

76,647

0.1699349

1.853638

0

189

76,597

0.2224369

2.020891

0

182

76,646

0.2798972

1.987797

0

189

Table 3. Operations Engaging an Enemy and Total Civilian
Casualties.

Enemy

IRR

z

p value

n

R2

1.066

2.5

.012

73,243

.561

Note. Dependent variable is number of civilian deaths and injuries. A zeroinflated negative-binomial model is used and the coefficient is reported in
IRR. IRR = incident rate ratio.

more likely to be killed or wounded. With a p value of .012,
approximately 7% more of a nonenemy is killed or injured
when the operation targets an enemy. Stated another way, an
additional civilian is killed after approximately 14 enemy
engagements. This loss is not dramatic, but it is significant.
In addition, the McFadden’s R2 is moderately high (.561),
indicating that 56.1% variation in the deaths of civilians is
explained by this type of operation.
In addressing Hypothesis 2, “when engaged in enemy
operations, enemy forces are more likely to be killed,” a
zero-inflated negative-binomial model is utilized again. The
result of this regression is reported in Table 4. The focus of
this regression is to determine whether engagements with the
enemy are successful, that is, whether enemies being killed
or wounded when the purpose of the operation is to kill enemies. The result of this regression indicates that enemies are
slightly less likely (p = .002) to be killed during enemy
actions when compared with all other incidents. Enemies are
11% (IRR = 0.896) less likely to be killed. The McFadden’s
R2 is .576 indicating a moderately strong model in which

Table 4. Operations Engaging the Enemy Impact on Total Enemy
Casualties.

Enemy

IRR

z

p value

n

R2

0.896

−3.05

.002

73,194

.576

Note. Dependent variable is number of civilian deaths and injuries. A zeroinflated negative-binomial model is used and the coefficient is reported in
IRR. IRR = incident rate ratio.

Table 5. The Impact of Time on Civilian Casualties, Deaths, and
Injuries.

DV
IV
IRR
z
p value
n
R2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Total civilians
Year
1.048
3.1
.002
73,244
.592

Killed civilians
Year
0.961
−1.98
.048
73,247
.676

Injured civilians
Year
1.057
3.38
.001
73,246
.619

Note. Dependent variable (DV) is number of civilian deaths and injuries
and the independent varaible (IV) is the year. A zero-inflated negativebinomial model is used and the coefficient is reported in IRR.
IRR = incident rate ratio.

57.6% of variation in number of enemies killed can be
explained by enemy action under a zero-inflated negativebinomial model.
The data used in this study spans from 2004 to 2009, a
5-year period. Over this time, it would be expected by most
that operations would become more effective. Gaining control of enemy territory and more accurate intelligence should
result in more effective engagements. Thus, the Hypothesis 3
assumes that civilians are less likely to be killed or wounded
as the years pass. As reported in Table 5, Model one’s results
are contrary to the assumption of fewer civilian losses.
Afghan civilians could expect an increase of .04 of a life lost
or a person wounded for every year that passes. To investigate this further, Models 2 and 3 report the number of additional lives lost and people wounded, respectively. Model 2
indicates that fewer Afghan civilians (IRR = 0.961) were
killed as the years passed, but Model 3 indicates that more
Afghan civilians (IRR = 1.057) were wounded for every
year. McFadden’s R2 values indicate moderately strong
model fit for all three regressions.
Although the numbers of nonenemy casualties are certainly unwanted losses, the argument could be made that
those losses are necessary to kill or wound enemies. The
final hypothesis in this study seeks to find the price of a
nonenemy combatant paid in enemy combatants. The results
of this regression assume that a nonenemy life is worth as
much as an enemy life; it certainly could be argued otherwise, but setting one as being more valuable and to what
degree would be quite controversial. The results of the
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Table 6. Impact of the Number of Enemy Casualties on the
Number of Civilian Casualties.

Total enemy

IRR

z

p value

n

R2

1.013

3.62

.000

76,597

.562

Note. Dependent variable is number of civilian deaths and injuries. A zeroinflated negative-binomial model is used and the coefficient is reported in
IRR. IRR = incident rate ratio.

regression using a zero-inflated negative-binomial model
are represented in Table 6. As the table displays, for every
enemy that was killed or wounded, 1,013 nonenemies were
killed or wounded. The result is significant (p = .000) and
the McFadden’s R2 is .562.

Discussion
It has been said that every war has its casualties and every
victory its price. As the United States draws down troops
from the Afghan region, it is difficult to find closure since no
victory or defeat has been evident. Results of this study are
mixed but the results do not favor the conclusion that the
military has been very effective in killing more enemies than
civilians. To assess the military’s effectiveness, four hypotheses were tested, each centering on civilian and enemy
casualties.
The first hypothesis assumes that casualties, wounding or
death, of civilians during an enemy confrontation would act
as a disservice to the overall mission in Afghanistan. The
results indicated that, compared with all other operations,
civilians were more likely to become casualties during
enemy action. Although this offers some insight into the
effectiveness of engagements with the enemy in Afghanistan,
it focuses only on the losses. Thus, Hypothesis 2 sought to
determine whether enemies were also more likely to be killed
or wounded when engaged. The results of the analysis indicate that enemies have a lower likelihood of being a casualty
when U.S. troops directly engage the enemy.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 assumed that enemy action is of primary concern when considering losses, thus Hypothesis 3
included all operations from 2004 to 2009 in assessing
whether U.S. operations have become safer over time.
Results of the three models that investigated this hypothesis
found that although the number of civilians killed decreased,
the number of wounded increased. The result is an overall
increase in the likelihood of a civilian casualty.
Although the previous hypotheses shed some light on the
effectiveness of military operations, a convincing argument
remained unchallenged. That is, although civilian lives are
lost, the number of enemies that are killed or wounded is
assumed to compensate those losses. Put another way, the
number of civilian losses were considered acceptable as long
as an increased number of enemies were killed as a result.
Because making an assumption that a civilian or enemy life

is worth more or less would be wrought with pitfalls, this
study assumed that one enemy killed or wounded is worth
the same as one civilian casualty. The results of the final
analysis indicate that military operations kill or wound
slightly more civilians than enemies. In any one operation,
this would be acceptable, but this is an analysis of nearly
77,000 operations over a 5-year period.
The results of this study have indicated that between the
years of 2004 and 2009, civilians were more likely than enemies to become casualties during operations in which the
enemy is engaged. In addition, nonenemies have become
slightly more likely to be wounded but slightly less likely to
be killed. Finally, the tradeoff between enemy and civilian
casualties favors the enemy. That is, in general, for every
enemy casualty, more than one civilian is a casualty from
U.S.-led military operations. The results of this study are a
sobering reminder of the great losses in war. Assessment of
the military’s effectiveness during the Afghan War could be
subjective, but the data and analyses used in this study are
purposed to be objective. Assuming that the lives of the
Afghan people are as valuable as those of terrorists/insurgents, U.S. operations were not effective. Yet, this assumption should not be taken lightly. In the safe confines of an
office or home, many might argue in support of the humanitarian perspective so evident in this article, but for the military members who fought this war, this perspective may not
be practical (Slim, 2003). Actors in the war must grapple
with their own perceptions of how much “they” are like “us”
(Slim, 2003). Those who are spectators of the war may find
it simple to partition enemies and civilians, but actors are
charged with deciding upon this partition in a moment when
their own lives are in jeopardy.

Limitations
Determining the effectiveness of complex systems can
incite passionate arguments. This study sought to measure
military effectiveness using variables that are less subjective: the casualties of war. Although simplistic, its purpose
is to get to the heart of the problem; if U.S. Armed Forces
are injuring or killing more innocent people than enemies,
those military operations cannot be considered effective.
On the other hand, other measures of effectiveness can be
argued. Future research should seek more objective ways to
measure military operations using a variety of definitions
of effectiveness.
Data on military operations in current conflicts are difficult to obtain. This researcher could only acquire data from
2004 to 2009. Optimally, military operations should be analyzed regularly and these results should be shared with the
public. That is not to say that classified information should
be available to our enemy; instead, analysis in the aggregate
should be shared with the public. Future research should utilize a larger time span of data so that more accurate findings
can be established.
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In conclusion, it may be that the success or failure of the
Afghan War can only be determined decades after U.S.
Forces leave the nation. Economic and political institutions
that serve the people remain to be fully developed and it
could take a significant number of years before that can be
accomplished. Thus, the story of the country of Afghanistan
may have only just begun. In the future, U.S. operations
could be marked as the driving force for prosperous change
or they could be identified as the entity that caused so much
harm to the Afghan people. This study cannot assess how the
Afghan War has changed and will continue to change lives,
culture, and the world, but it does imply that the cost to the
Afghan people exceeds the costs incurred by the enemy.
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